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THE EVACUATION OF JAPANESE-A1vTERICANS FROM WASHINGTON STATE 
DURING WORLD WAR II: A STUDY IN RACE DISCRIMINATION 
In 1964 Congress passed a major civil rights bill 
designed to give equal rights to all Americans regardless of 
race, but there was a time when that same government under 
pressures of war, denied civil rights to citizens as well as 
non-citizens strictly because of race. Going back twenty-
three years, one can study the racial discrimination practiced 
by the United States government towards another minority 
group--the Japanese-Americans. This paper will cover: 
(1) Why the Japanese-Americans were evacuated during World 
War II; (2) How they were evacuated; (J) The consequences of 
their evacuation. Because of the vast program of relocation 
of all the Japanese-Americans on the Pacific Coast, this 
study will be limited to the 14,565 Japanese-Americans of 
Washington State. 
CHAPTER I 
WHY THE JAPANESE-AMERICANS WERE EVACUATED 
Background 
When Commodore Matthew C. Perry entered the Bay of 
Yedo in 1854 "he thought that he was merely opening Japan to 
American commerce, but he actually opened America to Japanese 
labor.tr (10:3} Chinese laborers were prohibited from enter-
ing the United States in 1882 when the Chinese Exclusion Act 
was passed, yet American businesses needed cheap labor so 
they encouraged Japanese laborers to immigrate. The number 
of Japanese in the United States jumped from 184 in 1880 to 
24,000 in 1900. But in 1907 the United States and Japan 
signed a treaty restricting Japanese immigration to only 185 
per year, and finally in 1924, Congress barred all Japanese 
immigrants. "Originally, they came to this country to acquire 
wealth and return to their native country." (10:3) But after 
living here, raising their children here, "they chose not to 
return to their 'Fatherland of birth,' but elected to cherish 
the privilege of living permanently in their 'Motherland of 
dreams.'" (10 :3) 
According to the 1940 census, there were about 127,000 
persons of Japanese ancestry in the continental United States 
which represented less than one per cent of the total United 
States population. Over 47,000 of the resident Japanese had 
been born in Japan and about 98 per cent of them had entered 
the country prior to the Oriental Exclusion Act of 1924 and 
almost one half of the total arrived before 1910. "With 
numerically unimportant exceptions, they were ineligible to 
American citizenship." (40:1) However, Congress passed an 
act in June 1935 making aliens eligible for citizenship if 
(1) they had served in the United States armed forces during 
World War I and had been honorably discharged: and (2) if 
they were permanent residents of the United States. Only a 
small number of Japanese obtained citizenship under this act 
before it expired on January 1, 1937. (40:1) 
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Of the 127,000 Japanese in the United States, over 90 
per cent or about 113,000 lived in the four Western states of 
Arizona, California, Oregon and Washington. In Washington 
there were 14,565 persons of Japanese ancestry in 1941. Most 
of these people, 11,913, lived in King and Pierce counties. 
Nearly two-thirds of the Japanese in the state had been born 
in this country and were automatically American citizens. 
Thus, only 5,683 were aliens or foreign born Japanese. (For 
future reference, the following terms will be used to distin-
guish between the different groups of Japanese aliens and 
the Japanese-Americans: The word "Issei" will refer to the 
first generation immigrants from Japan. The Japanese children 
born in the United States will be called "Nisei.") In the 
United States in 1940 most of the Issei were old, over 50 per 
cent of them being over 50 years of age, with 17 per cent 
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being over 60 and only eight per cent under 35. By contrast, 
the Nisei were characterized by their youth with over 66 per 
cent being under the age of 20 and less than three per cent 
being over 3 5. In Washington State, out of the 14, 565 
Japanese, 8,882 were Nisei and 5,683 were Issei. 
Causes for Action 
With the sneak attack on Pearl Harbor by Japan on 
December 7, 1941, the American people as a whole were con-
fused and uneasy. The apparent success of the Japanese enemy 
in the Pacific exposed the entire Pacific Coast to possible 
attack. Wild rumors spread about a Japanese fifth column in 
Hawaii that had helped the Pearl Harbor attack. Secretary of 
the Navy Frank Knox clouded the truth when he said at a press 
conference in Washington, D. C., on December 15 that the "most 
effective fifth-column work of the entire war was done in 
Hawaii, with the possible exception of Norway." (42:10) 
Apparently "what Secretary Knox actually had in mind, it now 
seems clear from all the available evidence, was that espionage 
activity was carried out by agents in the Japanese consulate 
in Honolulu and perhaps, to some extent, by special emissaries 
who had quite recently come into the territory from the 
Japanese home islands." (42:10) Unfortunately, the Secretary 
of the Navy did not say this at that time and left the public 
to its own interpretation of his remarks. Almost immediately 
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a government official took exception to Secretary Knox's 
choice of words. Curtis B. Munson had made a government sur-
vey of the loyalty of resident Japanese both in Hawaii and 
on the West coast in November 1941. According to his find-
ings the resident Japanese were loyal to the United States 
and the Nisei were completely Americanized. About Knox's 
term "fifth-column" he said, "Fifth-column activities, such 
as in Norway, impugns the loyalty of a certain large percent-
age of a population." (42:11) Honolulu officials also seemed 
to discredit Knox's insinuations. The chief of police, the 
chief of military intelligence, and the special agent in 
charge of the FBI office in Honolulu all denied that there 
was any sabotage by Japanese or Japanese-American residents 
of the territory. (42:10) However, several other simultaneous 
and unrelated developments seemed to strengthen Knox's state-
ment: (1) continuing reports of enemy submarine activity off 
the West coast; (2) the unfounded rumors of resident Japanese 
sabotage at Pearl Harbor which were spread on the mainland 
by women and children evacuees from Honolulu. (42:11) 
(3) reports circulating of signal lights being visible along 
the West coast and the interception of unidentified radio 
transmissions; (4) government reports of spot raids which 
revealed hidden quantities of contraband such as guns, rifles, 
ammunition, and maps. (The government failed to point out 
that much of this contraband was legal to possess in peace 
time and that a large number of guns and rifles and anununi-
tion collected was taken from Nisei-owned sporting goods 
stores, while the maps were nothing more than what any citi-
zen or alien might have in the glove compartment of his 
car. ( 24: 262) 
In Hawaii, where the population was predominently of 
Japanese ancestry, the Issei and Nisei became part of the 
war effort without any hesitation and they had the support 
of officials who quickly denied that there was any disloy-
alty by these people. (24:266) However, in Washington State 
as elsewhere on the West Coast, a minority of outspoken, 
white American citizens began to wonder, question, and 
finally to demand the evacuation of all the Japanese resi-
dents. They and the government used the term "Japanese" to 
include both lssei and Nisei. (43:9) The Bremerton American 
Legon Post No. 149 stated that it was impossible to segre-
gate loyal from disloyal Japanese and that the security of 
the United States was in jeopardy as long as any Japanese 
were within the coastal area. Their resolution said in part 
that the "recent attack upon Pearl Harbor was a glaring 
example of Japanese trickery and indictive of the disastrous 
results that may be obtained by fifth-column activities 
operating in conjunction with the enemy from without." (17:7) 
An editorial in a daily Seattle paper implied that the 
Japanese should prove their loyalty. Part of the editorial 
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stated: 
Apparently the department of justice is not entirely 
satisfied with the present situation upon the 
Pacific Coast. Whether the measures already taken 
affecting Japanese will meet all requirements for 
national safety is still to be determined. There 
is still opportunity for the residents of the 
Japanese community to demonstrate their loyalty. 
And if sterner measures are to be taken later they 
should be carried out without rancor and with full 
recognition that some hardships necessarily will 
be inflicted upon those who do not deserve them. (1$:$) 
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Some letters to the editor of a daily Seattle newspaper also 
show the high degree of anti-Japanese feeling. One man wrote: 
No citizen can hold a dual allegiance and be a loyal 
American. I mean Japs and Japs only, for the Italians 
and Germans are few and far between who are not here 
in good faith and the few exceptions can easily be 
brought to book. 
I personally know a Jap who is to all indica-
tions a big shot among his kind who, when his son 
completed high school, whisked him off to Japland 
{Si£/ to enter college. Anyone suggesting that 
Papa Jap is a trustworthy American resident and 
entitled to be free, at large and conducting a 
business under the same protection as other people 
is just putting up an argument that won't add up 
for me. 
Herd them up, ship them to labor camps and when 
we have finished slaughtering their progenitors in 
the old country then herd them up again and send 
them all back. (17:10) 
Even after a period of three years the idea of disloyal resi-
dent Japanese was present as evidenced by this letter to a 
Seattle paper: 
I would like to ask one question. Do you remember 
December 7? If so, you'll agree that appearances 
deceive. Especially Japanese appearances. 
I think this also applies to our so called 
Japanese-Americans. Pearl Harbor could not have 
been successful without a tremendous amount of help 
from here. Who gave it to them? The Japs are a 
menace to our standard of living and to our safety. (23:12) 
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Many questions were raised in the minds of suspicious 
Washingtonians: Why did the Japanese live mostly in the area 
west of the Cascades? Why were the largest concentrations in 
Seattle, Tacoma, and Olympia areas? Why were the heaviest 
concentration of these Japanese people between Seattle and 
Tacoma in the Green River and Puyallup River valleys? After 
all, Boeing Airplane Company was located in the Green River 
Valley. Why did these people operate vegetable markets along 
the Seattle and Tacoma waterfronts and farm near the 
Bremerton Navy Yard? Why were they engaged in fishing along 
the Pacific Coast and near the Columbia River1 Why were 
these Japanese located near the forests of our state? It 
looked on the surface to a small but loud and vicious minority 
that these Japanese people had settled in these regions only 
to plan and carry out sabotage so that Japan could conquer 
the area. 
However, on closer examination, it should have been 
clear that the Japanese settled along the river valleys and 
near the large cities only to carry out their work of truck 
farming. They set up their markets in areas, not because 
they wanted to be near the waterfronts or near the navy yards 
but to be located in the middle of the cities and close to 
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markets. Other Japanese were fishermen and their logical 
place was on or near the ocean and major rivers. Noreover, 
some had settled in these areas before industry had moved to 
the suburbs. For example, Boeing Airplane Company in Renton 
was built on farmland at the start of World War II, and natu-
rally there would be Japanese in the vicinity. 
Prejudice or discrimination against the Japanese was 
not new. Prior to World War II, and even today, aliens were 
forbidden to own land in some of the Western states, includ-
ing the state of Washington. The parents of Nisei were 
denied by the law the right of citizenship. In many 
Washington cities residential choice was limited by covenants 
in real estate contracts. Intermarriage with Caucasians was 
forbidden in most Western states. 
With the arrival of the war, discrimination increased. 
All Japanese were prohibited from travel on any public car-
rier. "As early as December 8, the status of Nisei as 
American citizens was disregarded in favor of their status 
as descendants of the Japanese enemy." (40:6) Some Japanese, 
aliens and citizens, were stopped and questioned by authori-
ties. Heads of Japanese associations, societies, and schools 
as well as owners of import-export businesses were picked up, 
detained without charge by the FBI, and taken to Immigration 
Headquarters in Seattle. The treasurer of the Tacoma 
Japanese Association, Shuichi Fukui, a World War I veteran 
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and citizen of the United States, was one of those picked up 
and taken to Seattle. He was held for a period of two weeks 
and then released as were the other Japanese who were citizens 
of the United States. The alien Japanese who had held impor-
tant positions were held and finally sent to a special enemy 
alien camp at !Vli.ssoula, Montana, for the duration of the 
war. (4:-) Meanwhile, others at home were losing their jobs 
and being evicted from their homes. Some grocers refused to 
sell them food, and milk deliveries also stoped "because of 
a mistaken notion that this would constitute trading with the 
enemy." (24:261} At a small flower, fruit, and produce market 
operated in downtown Tacoma by Jack and Sarah Sugimoto, 
former customers would stop by and speak but only about half 
would make any purchases. Towards the end of January when it 
looked like all Japanese would be evacuated the owner of the 
market told the Sugimotos that someone else wanted their 
prime market location and they must be out of business in 
four days. (27:-) When all alien funds were frozen in 
December, many families had only what money they happened to 
have in their pockets. Without cash, the utilities were shut 
off and credit cancelled. 
To further complicate the situation, on February 5, 
1942, Congressman Martin Dies of Texas, chairman of a special 
committee on Un-American Activities, claimed to have evidence 
that the Japanese would attempt to land on both coasts at the 
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same time and that the Japanese-Americans in Hawaii had aided 
the enemy on December 7. (24:262) Another committee in the 
House of Representatives known as the Select Committee 
Investigating National Defense Migration (commonly called the 
Tolan Committee after its chairman, John H. Tolan of 
California) held hearings which began on February 21. Its 
purpose was to investigate possible solutions to the 
"Japanese problem" on the West Coast. Hearings began in San 
Francisco and continued in Seattle, Portland, Los Angeles, 
and lasted about one month. These hearings provided a stage 
for all anti-Oriental groups such as the Native Sons of the 
Golden West, the Associated Farmers, and the Joint Immigra-
tion Committee, all of which testified before this committee 
and urged the complete evacuation of all Japanese from the 
West Coast for the duration of the war. 
At the Tolan hearings in Seattle on February 28, 
Governor Arthur B. Langlie, who had been pursuing a moderate 
course, said: 
Every precaution should be made to be humane and 
American in this task, but the people feel this is 
no time to worry about hurting feelings. Safety is 
the prime factor--safety of production and safety 
of the people. (29:1) 
Two strong advocates of evacuation were the state 
attorney-general and the mayor of Seattle. The Attorney 
General, Smith Troy, told the committee the danger of vigi-
lantism "had caused him most concern. The prosecuting 
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attorneys of the thirty-nine counties in the state had re-
ported that the danger of mob violence was growing. A disas-
ter at the battle fronts might result in outbreaks of vio-
lence. II ( 5: 109) r•Iayor Earl r'~illikin of Seattle said, !! Among 
the American-born are some of the most disloyal. We can't 
afford to take chances by leaving one whose loyalty is 
questionable." (29:1) The only elected local official to 
oppose mass evacuation was J'.1ayor Harry P. Cain of Tacoma. He 
told the Tolan Committee that he favored selective instead of 
mass evacuation because the Japanese operated farm produce 
businesses worth $1,000,000 per year in the Puyallup Valley 
and accounted for about 39 per cent of the farm land in 
Pierce County. (29:1) The manager of the Washington Produce 
Shippers' Association, Floyd Oles, said he felt the Japanese 
could be "settled on the soil and guarded by the army and the 
FBI, with an armed guard, if necessary, at every third fence 
post." (29:1) When Fred Fueker, department adjutant of the 
state organization of the American Legion, testified, he 
took a more liberal stand than had a large majority of the 
individual Legion posts. Fueker said that among the Nisei 
"any number of them are real Americans and that, therefore, 
an attempt should be made to evacuate citizens on a selec-
tive basis. If segregation were impossible, citizens and 
aliens alike should be evacuated. 11 ( 5: 43) '11he Seattle 
Downtown Kiwanis Club formally asked that all "enemy aliens 
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and all Japanese ••• forthwith be removed from the Pacific 
Slope." (5:55) Two other organizations, the Lake Washington 
Business Men's Association and the Eastern Washington Beet 
Growers association, also testified and urged evacuation. 
When the Tolan Report was issued in Jv,ay, it stated that no 
sabotage had taken place. However, it was too late to be 
of importance, for two months earlier, General DeWitt, head 
of the Western Defense Command, had announced that all 
Japanese would be evacuated from coastal areas. 
During the early months of 1942, Congressmen were 
advocating action by the federal government. In February the 
West Coast Congressional delegations (except Senator Johnson 
and Congressman Lea of California) formed two committees: 
(1) the Committee of Alien Nationality and Sabotage headed by 
Senator Iv.onrad C. Wallgren of Washington State, whose purpose 
was to see that adequate internal protection against sabotage 
was taken; and (2) the Committee on Defense headed by Senator 
Holman of Oregon, whose purpose was to see to the adequate 
defense of the Pacific Coast. Their joint final action came 
on February 13th when, in a letter to President Roosevelt, 
they urged evacuation of all Japanese. (5:71) During this 
time Senator Wallgren received letters from his constituents 
in Washington State demanding evacuation. Organizations such 
as the American Legion, the Grange, seven Chamber of Commerce 
groups, the Kiwanis, the Lions, the Shriners, and nine trade 
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unions demanded evacuation. (5:218) Congressman John Coffee 
of Washington was an adherent of moderate action even though 
he later went along with his colleagues. He said: 
It is my fervent hope and prayer that residents of 
the United States of Japanese extraction will not 
be made victims of programs directed by self-
proclaimed patriots and by hysterical self-anointed 
heroes • • • • As one who has lived as a neighbor 
to Japanese-Americans, I have found these people, 
on the whole, to be law-abiding, industrial and 
unobstrusive. Let us not make a mockery of our 
Bill of Rights by mistreating these folks. Let us 
rather regard them with understanding, remembering 
they are victims of a Japanese war machine, 
with the making of international policies of which 
they had nothing to do. (5:62) 
Even though three months had passed since Pearl Harbor 
and no case of sabotage was discovered on the West Coast, the 
public, or at least a portion of it, continued to demand 
evacuation of all coastal areas. (5:262-5) The Sixth District 
of the American Legion urged the Federal Government to lock 
up all Japanese for the duration of the war and to deport 
them after the war. The Native Sons of the Golden West in 
California raised funds to try to cancel the citizenship 
rights of Americans of Japanese ancestry. 1 
The field of communications, both radio and newspapers, 
l"This last-mentioned report is worth pausing over. 
An organized group of our fellow-citizens is asking that 
another group of our fellow-citizens, distinguished solely 
by their descent from persons of a certain race be deprived 
of their citizenship rights. This time this is being advo-
cated not in Nazi Germany but in California, U. S. A~ (15:153) 
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was also a source of prejudice against the Japanese-Americans 
in the early part of 1942. On February 12, 1942, Walter 
Lippman implied in a column written from the West Coast that 
sabotage had occurred in Hawaii and was likely to happen on 
the West Coast when the right moment came. 
The Pacific Coast is in imminent danger of a 
combined attack from within and from without. *** 
This is a sober statement of the situation, in fact, 
a report based not on speculation but on what is 
known to have taken place and to be taking place in 
this area of the war. It is the fact that the 
Japanese navy has been reconnoitering the Pacific 
Coast more or less continually and for a consid-
erable period of time, testing and feeling out the 
American defenses. It is the fact that communica-
tion takes place between the enemy at sea and enemy 
agents on land. These are the facts which we shall 
ignore or minimize at our own peril. It is also 
the fact that since the outbreak of the Japanese 
war there has been no important sabotage on the 
Pacific coast. From what we know about Hawaii and 
about the fifth-column in Europe, this is not, as 
some have liked to think, a sign that there is no-
thing to be feared. It is a sign that the blow is 
well organized and that it is held back until it 
can be struck with maximum effect. *** I am sure I 
understand fully and appreciate thoroughly the un-
willingness of Washington to adopt a policy of mass 
evacuation and internment of all those who are 
technically enemy aliens. But I submit that 
Washington is not defining the problem on the Pacific 
coast correctly. *** The Pacific coast is officially 
a combat zone; some part of it may at any moment be 
a battlefield. Nobody's constitutional rights in-
clude the right to reside and do business on a 
battlefield. And nobody ought to be on a battle-
field who has no good reason for being there. (42:12) 
Henry McLemore in the San Francisco Examiner and Westbrook 
Pegler in the Seattle Post Intelligencer, both nationally 
known writers, in their respective columns made bitter attacks 
against the Japanese and urged their removal. John B. Hughes 
on the :Mutual Broadcasting Company conducted a bitter anti-
Japanese campaign on the radio. (40:17) 
15 
However, not all Americans approved of this racial dis-
crimination and many spoke out against any mass evacuation as 
an infringement of civil rights. John Dewey and Harry Emerson 
Fosdick were among hundreds that wrote the President and 
urged non-evacuation of all Japanese. Congressman Tolan, 
after all his hearings were held and with the facts known, 
opposed the evacuation, as did Louis Goldblatt of the 
California State Industrial Union Council (CIO). Norman 
Thomas, after action had been taken, wrote: "No possible 
danger of sabotage could so menace our cause as has the 
Japanese propaganda in Asia describing our treatment of 
Asiatics, apparently less guilty of actual sabotage than 
German agents." (41:95} 
Among the groups that opposed mass evacuation of all 
Japanese were the National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People, the American Association of University Women, 
the International Ladies Garment Workers Union, the Civil 
Liberties Union, the National Council of Jewish Women, Family 
Welfare Association of America, the Socialist Party, the YT-·1CA i 
and the YWCA. The Tacoma News Tribune in an editorial on 
harch 6, 1942, urged great care and caution to safe guard 
justice for the alien Japanese if they were evacuated. 
While most of those who have been urging the evacu-
ation of aliens from this district have been moti-
vated solely by patriotic ideals, it is known that 
there have been a few who are using patriotism as 
a cloak and who have their eyes on fertile fields 
or business property which they hope to acquire for 
below real value. 
Such a procedure would savor too much of the 
practices and policies to those with whom we are at 
war. We want no forced sales of valuable alien 
property to favored individuals at prices far below 
real values, such as occurred during the First World 
War. 
Here is a situation which the public should watch. 
War is no excuse to permit avaricious individuals 
to steal the property of ousted aliens. Such pro-
cedure would be a blot on the good name of this 
state. We must see that justice is done in this 
important matter and that the greedy and unscruplous 
do not seize the opportunity to make big personal 
profit • ( 3 0: 16) 
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Later when mass evacuation of all Japanese was announced 
by the government, the News Tribune in an editorial on March 27, 
1942, compared this to two other mass evacuations in North 
American history: the Acadians of Nova Scotia and the 
Loyalists or Tories of the new United States. (33:18) 
Federal Action 
Action by the federal government began on December 8, 
1941, when President Roosevelt asked Congress for a declara-
tion of war. At first, the domestic war restrictions applied 
only to enemy aliens, which followed the precedent of World 
War I. However, 
almost all immigrants of Japanese origin were, 
because of their ineligibility to citizenship, 
automatically classified as enemy aliens, a situ-
ation in sharp contrast with that facing immigrants 
from the two other enemy nations, Italy and Germany, 
a large proportion of whom had become naturalized 
American citizens and were thus exempt from the 
enemy-alien classification. (40:5) 
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These restrictions included travel, possession of contraband 
items, possible exclusion from military zones, and internment 
of any alien that might be dangerous to the national security. 
Attorney General of the United States was in charge of carry-
ing out the terms of the proclamation. However, he was 
relieved of his duties when on February 19 the President 
issued an Executive Order authorizing the Secretary of War 
to prescribe military areas from which he and military com-
manders may exclude any or all persons. Two categories of 
restricted areas were set up: (1) Category A. Areas through 
or within which no alien enemies may be permitted under any 
circumstances; (2) Category B. Areas through or within which 
alien enemies may be permitted on pass or permit. (43:20) 
The Western part of the United States was under the protec-
tion of the Western Defense Command headed by General John L. 
DeWitt who, in 1943, told a Congressional Committee that ''A 
Jap's a Jap. It makes no difference whether he is an American 
citizen or not." (24:276) This was the man who would be 
responsible for the complete evacuation of all "Japanesen 
from the West Coast because of nmilitary necessity.n 
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The Western Defense Command classified the population 
under its control into six classes: Class 1. Japanese aliens. 
Class 2. American citizens of Japanese ancestry. Class 3 
and 4. German and Italian aliens. Class 5. Any person, 
citizen or alien, who was suspected of being actually or 
potentially dangerous. Class 6. All other persons. (24:28) 
The alien enemy control coordinator and chief of General 
DeWitt's civilian staff was Tom C. Clark. 
On March 2 General DeWitt issued Proclamation No. 1, 
which set up r·1ili tary Area No. 1 from which any or all persons 
could be excluded. For the first time the official press 
releases made it clear that all Japanese were liable to be 
evacuated. (2:146) The following headline appeared in the 
Tacoma News Tribune on March 3, 1942: "City, Coast Barred 
to Japanese." The Wartime Civilian Control Administration 
was then created by General DeWitt to help encourage volun-
tary evacuation of Ivdlitary Area No. 1, which in Washington 
included the area from the eastern base of the Cascade 
hountains westward to the ocean. It also included Western 
Oregon and California. Proclamation No. 2 was issued by 
DeWitt on IvLarch 16, which extended the alien control program 
to include Idaho, TJlontana, Nevada and Utah. When voluntary 
evacuation did not work well enough, General DeWitt asked 
that a new agency be set up to try to correct this problem. 
On Karch 18 Preisdent Roosevelt created the War Relocation 
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Authority by Executive Order. Its duty was to relocate the 
Japanese in new areas, provide for their needs, and to super-
vise their activities. Milton S. Eisenhower, assistant secre-
tary of agriculture, was appointed as director, but served 
only until June 17 when Dillon S. Myer was appointed to 
replace him. The first compulsory evacuation of an area in 
the United States took place on l'~arch 24 when General DeWitt 
issued Civilian Exclusion Order No. 1. This affected all 
persons of Japanese ancestry living on Bainbridge Island, 
Washington, which lay in a north-south direction on western 
Puget Sound and could provide easy access to ships that must 
pass by going to the Bremerton Naval Ship Yards. On March 
29, General DeWitt ordered all voluntary evacuation by 
Japanese in ~ilitary Area No. 1 to stop. (The process of 
voluntary evacuation will be further explained in Chapter II.) 
By June 1, 1942, the compulsory evacuation of Japanese from 
Ivdli tary Area No. 1 to assembly or re lo ca ti on centers was 
practically complete. 
The reasons given for this compulsory evacuation were 
summed up in the phrase, "military necessity.n (15:149) The 
western portion of Washington State fell under this "military 
necessity" because it was dominated by waterways, forests, 
vital installation of industry, military and naval bases, an 
airplane factory, and shipyards. The fact that so many persons 
of Japanese ancestry were concentrated in the Puget Sound was 
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was reviewed as a threat to military security. Seattle, the 
principal port in the Northwest; Deception Pass Bridge, the 
only means by land to the naval base on Whidby Island; and 
the forests which help to produce a large bulk of the sawed 
lumber in the United States, must be protected. The distance 
between inhabited areas on the coast of Washington was too 
great to constantly check; thus, it seemed like the only 
course open to the military was total evacuation. (43:15) By 
June 7, 1942, some 9$ exclusion orders later, the Japanese 
from Military Area No. 1 were concentrated in specific 
centers. "The idealogy of racism had finally prevailed over 
the doctrine that Americanism was not a racial matter and 
that all citizens were equal before the law." (24:277) 
CHAPTER II 
HOW THE JAPANESE-AMERICANS WERE EVACUATED 
Voluntary Evacuation 
Even before Public Proclamation No. 1 was issued in 
1V1arch, some voluntary evacuation had begun when about 9, 000 
Issei and Nisei moved to the eastern parts of the coastal 
states, including 499 men and women who voluntarily moved in 
Washington State. Some Nisei bought land and planted crops, 
but they eventually were forced to move to assembly centers 
before they could harvest. General DeWitt urged this volun-
tary evacuation program as did the Fourth Army which was in 
charge of the Western Defense Command. When the Wartime 
Civil Control Administration was created, 48 regional offices 
were set up in each important center of Japanese population 
in the West Coast area, the first civil control station being 
opened at Winslow, Washington, on Iv1arch 24. Their primary 
job was to encourage voluntary evacuation. The offices were 
staffed by representatives of the Federal Reserve Bank, to 
handle business and personal property; the Farm Security 
Administration, to handle all agricultural property; and the 
Federal Security Agency, to provide all necessary social 
services needed. "After these were started, specific plans 
for {compulsory) evacuation of Japanese from ~tilitary Area 
No. 1 were immediately initiated." (43:41) {These plans were 
not evident to all Japanese, however.) Since some major 
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economic and social problems developed from this voluntary 
evacuation, the President, by Executive Order, established the 
War Relocation Authority on March 18 with Milton S. Eisen-
hower as the director. Its functions were to supervise, to 
provide employment, and to resettle displaced evacuees. WRA 
had broad discretionary powers with only two limitations: 
It could not start further evacuation and it had no power to 
return evacuees to their original areas. (40:24) Prospective 
voluntary evacuees were urged to prepare for evacuation and 
were promised aid in moving with the government paying the 
cost of transportation to the interior and helping to find 
specific employment. However, the attitude of the interior 
states was hostile and showed that the evacuees were not 
welcomed. The fears that the Japanese voiced were clearly 
shown in a statement given to the Tolan Committee by Emer-
gency Defense Council, Seattle Chapter of the Japanese-
American League in Seattle: 
A large number of people have remarked that 
they will go where the government orders them to 
go willingly, if it will help the national defense 
effort. But the biggest problem in their minds 
is where to go. The first unofficial evacuation 
announcement pointed out that the government did 
not concern itself with where evacuees went, just 
so they left prohibited areas. Obviously, this 
was no solution to the question, for immediately, 
from Yakima, Idaho, Montana, Colorado and else-
where authoritative voices shouted: "No Japs 
wanted here!" 
The Japanese feared with reason that, forced 
to evacuate their homes, unable to find a place 
to stay, they would be kicked from town to town 
in the interior like the "Oakies" of John Steinbeck's 
novel. Others went further and envisioned the day 
when the inhabitants of inland states, aroused by 
the steady influx of Japanese, would refuse to sell 
gasoline and food to them. They saw, too, the possi-
bility of mob action against them as exhausted, im-
poverished and unable to travel further, they stopped 
in some town or village where they were not wanted. 
(43:101) 
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Over 270 Japanese people, 1$7 of whom were American 
citizens, who lived on Bainbridge Island, wanted and tried to 
move voluntarily but were unable to do so. Their leader, I. 
Nagatani, wanted to set up a cooperative colony of evacuated 
Japanese in Eastern Washington and Idaho. They planned to 
take over abandoned farms in these areas and would even pay 
most of the costs in their moving. However, the residents 
of Eastern Washington and Idaho opposed such a plan and the 
idea was dropped. These Japanese people were helpless for 
they could go nowhere voluntarily. Most of them were straw-
berry growers with their crop valued at $250,000. Their 
plants were just beginning to bud, but they cared for their 
crop until that time when they· must move. It was announced 
by the major daily newspapers in this state on March 23 that 
Bainbridge Island Japanese could leave voluntarily from 
March 23-30, providing their destination was approved by the 
Army. After March JO, they would be sent to the Manzanar 
Center in California. These newspapers also announced that 
the evacuees would be paid $50 per month, to be collected 
after the war, and charged $15 per person per month for 
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food. (31:1) (The actual pay for those working in the 
centers would range from $12 to $19 per month with no charge 
for food.) James Y. Sakamoto, general chairman of the emer-
gency defense council of the Seattle Chapter of the Japanese-
American Citizens League, wrote to President Roosevelt on 
¥..arch 25, 1942, asking him to 11point out to our fellow citi-
zens that we are not traitors, 11 (32:16) and asked that some 
refuge in the heart of the country be designated for the 
evacuees. He suggested the southern end of Moses Lake in the 
Columbia Basin reclamation area be opened for 10,000 Japanese, 
but the letter hardly had time to reach the President when 
General DeWitt ordered compulsory evacuation two days later. 
The entire voluntary evacuation program was terminated 
by General DeWitt, with Proclamation No. 4 on Narch 27, 1942, 
for two reasons: (1) to alleviate tension and to prevent 
incidents between Japanese evacuees and others; (2) to insure 
an orderly, supervised, and controlled evacuation with ade-
quate provision for the protection of evacuees and their 
property. (43:105) The final results of voluntary evacuation 
of men, women, and children in Washington State by counties 
appears in Table I, page 25. 
Compulsory Evacuation 
The controversy by this time was not should the evacu-
ation take place, but whether time and practical considera-
tions should be allowed for a study of individual cases 
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TABLE I 
BREAKDOWN OF VOLUNTARY EVACUEES 
IN WASHINGTON STATE (43:110) 
County Total :Men Women 
Chelan 2 1 1 
Clark 5 3 2 
King 403 183 220 
Kitsap 6 4 2 
Lewis 6 1 5 
Okanogan 3 3 0 
Pacific 5 2 3 
Pierce 56 26 30 
Thurston 6 2 4 
Yakima 
_]_ _.!±. _)_ 
499 229 270 
before evacuation, so that only dangerous individuals would 
be evacuated. Some Americans, such as the American Civil 
Liberties Union, asked if it would be constitutional to 
remove citizens indiscriminately without due process of law 
but Senator Ji.ion C. Wallgren, chairman of the Pacific Coast 
Congressional Committee on enemy aliens and sabotage, said 
the "War department would have the authority to bar any or 
all persons from restricted areas during wartime and it could 
be done without raising any constitutional or legal questions.rr 
(19:2) The decision had been made and was to be carried out. 
The general plan for the compulsory evacuation and 
relocation provided three main steps: (1) registering and 
servicing of evacuees at Civil Control Stations; (2} provi-
sions of temporary residences and a minimum of normal com-
munity services at assembly centers; (3) ultimate transfer of 
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evacuees to relocation centers under the control of the War 
Relocation Authority. While the initial recommendations for 
evacuation on February 14, 1942, contemplated the internment 
of only alien Japanese, this was now abandoned by General 
DeWitt. (43:43) The method of compulsory evacuation was as 
follows: First, the coastal strip of the United States was 
divided into 108 exclusion areas, 18 of which were in 
Washington State. As each area was ready for evacuation, the 
people were notified, with the heads of families and/or each 
individual living alone being required to report to Civil 
Control Stations for instructions and registration. Over 
$5,000,000 was made available for making loans against evacuee 
crops and farm equipment and also to find substitute farm 
operators who would take over these farms and equipment. The 
Federal Reserve Bank took the responsibility for personal 
property including business property and cars, but the Army 
offered to buy any car or truck for the Blue Book value. 
Each evacuee was given a health check for contagious diseases 
by the United States Public Health Service prior to their 
entry in the assembly centers. 
The evacuation procedure within the exclusion area 
covered a period of seven days. The Exclusion Order would be 
posted throughout the area from noon the first day to 5 a.m. 
on the second day. Registration of all persons of Japanese 
ancestry would take place on the second and third days. The 
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processing or preparing of evacuees for evacuation would 
take place on the fourth and fifth days. On the sixth and 
seventh days the evacuees were moved. (43:92) The first 
compulsory evacuation on the Pacific Coast was from 
Bainbridge Island in Puget Sound directly to Jv.anzanar 
Relocation Center in eastern California. The areas were to 
be evacuated as fast as possible in the order of their rela-
tive military importance. The Exclusion Order also stated: 
(1) the evacuation would not split family units or communi-
ties where this could be avoided; (2) the program should 
minimize financial loss to the evacuees; (3) the use of mili-
tary was to be at a minimum, instead the use of civilian 
personnel was recommended; (4) evacuation was to be as quick 
as possible and was to make the relocation centers self-
supporting; (5) evacuation was to include an initial move 
to assembly centers and then a more permanent move to reloca-
tion centers. (43:77) 
The provisions of the Exclusion Order were soon 
ignored. The first provision stated that family units would 
not be split, yet Ebaristo Arota, a Filipino, and his wife, 
Kiki, a Japanese, were separated when the Bainbridge Island 
residents were evacuated. The Army authorities said "they 
were compelled to deny requests that Arota be permitted to 
accompany the evacuees or that his wife be allowed to stay 
with him. 11 (34:1) The second provision said that financial 
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loss to the evacuees should be minimized, yet at the begin-
ning of the program some evacuees had as little as 48 hours 
to sell, rent, loan, store or even give away their real 
property and possessions. (1:124) The evacuees on Bainbridge 
Island had only four days to move voluntarily (March 23-27) 
and only two days' notice that the govern~ent would evacuate 
them to California (Iv~arch 27-29). Financial loss was inevi-
table. The third provision said that the use of the military 
should be at a minimum, but when the Bainbridge Island 
Japanese were moved the soldiers were in charge of the 
evacuation. One soldier who helped with the moving said it 
had been both a hard and an easy job, "Easy because the 
Japanese cooperated. Difficult because it was hard to see 
the Japanese having to leave their homes.rr (34:2) The fifth 
provision said that the Japanese would first be sent to 
assembly centers and then to a more permanent relocation 
center, yet the Bainbridge Island Japanese were sent directly 
to the Manzanar Relocation Center in California. In all, 
the entire evacuation job was completed by the Army in some 
68 days after the first actual removal, and done without 
any serious breakdown of operations. 
Assembly; Centers 
The assembly centers were initially called "induction 
centers." They were being planned at the same time the sites 
for the relocation centers were being sought. The plans 
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called for the use of existing facilities: thus fairgrounds 
and race tracks were the primary source of such locations. 
Only one site was picked in Washington and that was in 
Puyallup near the Western Washington Fairgrounds. The United 
States Engineer Corps were to construct suitable facilities 
for housing and feeding families. Only four weeks were 
allowed for completion of the projects with work beginning 
on the Puyallup Assembly Center on Karch 28 and being 
finished 17 days later. It cost $500,000 and would hold 
8,000 persons. Stories that were carried in the local papers 
described the buildings that would house the evacuees as 
being 40 feet by 15 feet and arranged in blocks with each 
family having a room (called an apartment) which was 20 feet 
by 15 feet. Families with over five members were allowed two 
rooms. Each room or apartment had a wood stove and steel 
cots with mattresses, (36:1) but the residents were to make 
or supply their own furniture. They would eat in mess 
halls. (35:1) The Seattle Japanese were the first to be sent 
to Puyallup Center starting on April 28, and they nick-named 
it Camp Harmony. 
The Western Defense Command hoped to move evacuees to 
an assembly center near their homes for the purpose of keeping 
the evacuees close by until property matters were settled but 
four of the five assembly centers were outside the state. 
They also hoped to group the evacuees in a center in a 
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similar climatic region, but the Japanese of Washington State 
were sent to five different assembly centers, as shown in 
Table II. 
TABLE II 
BREAKDOdN OF EVACUEES TO ASSEMBLY CENTERS (43:290) 
Assembly Relocation 
Residents Total Center Center 
1. Bainbridge Island 258 Vianzanar, Manzanar, 
California California 
2. Seattle and east- 7,314 Puyallup Minidoka, 
ern Pierce County Idaho 
3. King County (except-
ing Seattle), 
Kitsap County, and 
western part of 3,497 Pinedale, Tu.le Iake, 
Pierce County, Central California 
including Tacoma California 
4. Ckanogan, Chelan, 
Kittitas, Yakima, 1,165 Portland, Heart Mountain, 
Benton, Klickitat Oregon Wyoming 
Counties 
5. Watcorn, Skagit, 
Snohomish, Clallam, 
Jefferson, Grays 
Harbor, Mason, 
Thurston, Pacific, 657 Tule Iake, Tule Lake, 
Lewis, Wahkiakum, Northeastern California 
Cowlitz, Skamania, California 
and Clark Counties 
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Relocation Centers 
In total, ten relocation center sites were chosen with 
a majority of them on public lands, such as reclamation pro-
jects which the federal government owned. Each center had 
to be able to hold at least 5,000 persons, had to be distant 
from any strategic spot, and had to be capable of providing 
some of the necessary food. In the centers the evacuees were 
to live in Army-type barracks which were arranged in the 
rectangular form found in all Army camps. 'I'he centers resem-
bled both an Indian reservation, in that all the people were 
of one racial group, and an internment camp, being completely 
surrounded with a wire fence and armed guards. (15:152) Each 
center was to try to provide work for every able person above 
16 years of age with most of the jobs being farming but with 
limited positions available in the areas such as teaching, 
engineering, and other professional-type jobs. The evacuees' 
wage scale was $12 per month for unskilled labor, $16 per 
month for skilled work, and $19 per month for professional 
and supervisory work. This wage scale was used even though 
the Tolan Committee had recommended that evacuees be paid the 
current wages for comparable work outside of the centers. 
(24:294) The adult evacuees also received a clothing 
allowance of $3.75 per month while children were given $1.25. 
The Japanese in these centers were encouraged to take 
and carry out responsibility, and some served as assistants 
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to the chief of each center. Policies were also discussed 
with the evacuees. Each center had a hospital with doctors 
and nurses, many of whom were Japanese as was the chief 
police officer. A board of Judicial Review with a majority 
of its members being Japanese was set up to try petty cases 
in criminal court. In the centers only the Nisei could hold 
elective office, but the Issei could vote in the elections. 
The evacuees could leave the centers only for specific 
and properly guarded work projects and all centers were 
surrounded by barbed wire and were under guard, not only to 
keep evacuees in but to keep outsiders out. (15:155) Resent-
ment grew between the Caucasian staff and the Japanese 
inhabitants, especially at the Tule Lake Center. The 
Japanese were confined there, fed and clothed by the govern-
ment, housed in barracks with one family to one room,and 
their children were schooled in the center. The Caucasian 
staff had liberty to come and go, better food in their 
dining room, attractive apartments, a higher standard of 
living, and could send their children to outside schools. 
The transfer from the temporary assembly centers to 
the relocation centers was supposed to follow certain prime 
objectives: (1) evacuate entire comrnunities as units; 
(2) combine cozr.munities to get a balance between urban and 
rural population; (3) minimize change in climatic conditions; 
(4) keep the movement of each group to a minimum of 
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distance. (43:94) These principles were not always followed 
in the case of the Japanese from Washington. The climatic 
conditions between Puget Sound and eastern California are 
vastly different as are the conditions between eastern 
Washington and Portland, Oregon, where the eastern Washington 
evacuees were sent. The principle of keeping travel to a 
minimum was also violated when evacuees were sent from 
Washington to California, Oregon, Idaho, and Wyoming. As 
was previously mentioned, the Bainbridge Island Japanese were 
sent directly to l\'lanzanar Relocation Center in northeastern 
California and kept there. Seattle Japanese and Japanese 
from most of the eastern part of Pierce County were sent to 
the assembly center in Puyallup and were later sent to Minidoka 
Center in Idaho. The evacuees from Kitsap and the rest of 
King county (excluding Seattle) and western Pierce County 
(including Tacoma) were sent to the assembly center in 
Pinedale, California, and later to a relocation center at 
Tule Lake, California. (43:290) The residents of the counties 
west of the Columbia River and east of the Cascades were sent 
from Portland to Heart 11i .. ountain, Wyoming. The Japanese from 
the remainder of the Western Washington counties were to 
remain at Tule Lake in California. 
Thus the Japanese from Washington State were sent to 
four different relocation centers, but the greatest number 
were sent to the kinidoka Relocation Center, which was 
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located in Jerome County, Idaho, 25 miles northwest of Twin 
Falls. The center consisted of 33,500 acres of land obtained 
from the Bureau of Reclamation and could handle 10,000 
evacuees. The terrain was rolling but the soil was good for 
growing potatoes, sugar beets, beans, and peas. The ~ianzanar 
Assembly and Relocation Center was located in Inyo County, 
California. Located some 225 miles north of Los Angeles, it 
consisted of 60,000 acres leased fron; the city of Los Angeles, 
and since it hadn't been used for over 30 years the arid 
climate had turned it back into unproducing desert lands. 
The capacity of the center was 10,000 inhabitants. The 
Heart Iii.ountain Relocation Center was located in Park County 
in northwestern Wyoming and consisted of 46,000 acres with a 
capacity of 11,000 evacuees. The land had been public 
domain and was received from the Department of the Interior 
on a temporary transfer. The suitable crops for the soil 
were alfalfa, beans, sugar beets, seed peas, potatoes, soy 
beans, and small grains, but since it had only 5~ inches of 
rain per year, irrigation was necessary to raise these 
crops. The Tule Lake Assembly and Relocation Center was 
located in hodoc County, California, about 35 miles south-
east of Klamath Falls, Oregon. The site was formerly the 
bed of a lake and consisted of 7,400 acres of extremely 
fertile soil. The capacity of the center was 16,000 
evacuees, but its peak population was 18,789. (43:250-263) 
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Since the greatest number of Washington evacuees were 
sent to the ~inidoka Relocation Center, it deserves further 
discussion. Its peak population at any one time was 9,387 
residents, but during the entire duration about 13,000 
evacuees went through the center. To try to more fully 
Americanize the Issei, the center offered adult education 
classes in the evening which began November 1942 and lasted 
until September 1945. The curriculum included English, 
American history, American geography, and a current events 
study. About 1,800 evacuees took part in these courses with 
over 1,000 taking English. The Minidoka adult school system 
consisted of a supervisor, a regular Civil Service employee 
and 15 evacuee teachers who were paid $16 per month. At 
first only college graduates were used, but soon they chose 
to move further east on their own and resettle in normal 
communities. This created a problem. The Nisei were 
reluctant to teach their elders and the Issei were embar-
rassed to be taught by these youngsters. To solve the prob-
lem, four Caucasian high school teachers and the librarian 
taught some adult education classes. In addition to the 
adult education program, two elementary schools were estab-
lished in the center to take care of the 948 students in 
grades one through eight while a high school was set up to 
educate the 630 students in grades nine through twelve. In 
both elementary and secondary education the teaching staff 
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consisted of Caucasian and Nisei personnel. (10:98) 
The farm land at I·dnidoka consisted of about 270 
acres of cleared and irrigated soil on which over 2,200,000 
pounds of crops were harvested per season. "Open ditch irri-
gation was something new to most of the ex-northwest people 
and even to experienced irrigation experts, the raw sage 
brush and a rolling irregular terrain presented problems.u 
(10:108) However, the problems were solved and the farm land 
was able to provide a few root crops, like potatoes, for the 
other centers. The 1943 crop, for example, produced 979,770 
pounds of potatoes and also yielded many pounds of radishes, 
squash, cabbage, onions, tomatoes, and watermelons. 
The center maintained a fire department manned by 43 
evacuee-firemen and officers with two fire engines plus other 
equipment to fight range fires. ~~nidoka also had its own 
maintenance crew made up of 312 evacuee carpenters, electri-
cians, plumbers, boilermen, sanitary engineers, and janitors. 
The Internal Security Section served as the Center's police 
force with a Caucasian as its chief and an evacuee as its 
captain. Over fifty evacuees served on the police force. 
The center was served by three religious groups: the Roman 
Catholic Church, the Federated Christians, and the United 
Buddhists. Evacuee professional personnel including physi-
cians, graduate and student nurses, dentists, pharmacists, 
X-ray and laboratory workers served in the center's hospital 
under the supervision of a Caucasian medical officer and 
chief nurse. (10:90-114) 
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The most offensive thing to the Japanese at all the 
centers was the fence. "It was three months before the fence 
was built (at Iv ... inidoka). During that time the residents 
felt they were on their honor to follow the rules, and 
followed them." (24:302) In time, the fence was built, as 
has been previously mentioned, not only to keep the evacuees 
in, but also to keep racists out. The evacuees at this center 
resented several other things such as the evacuation and the 
prejudice which produced it; the loss of their property and 
jobs; the mockery of American ideals; the Japanese-American 
Citizens League, because it didn't resist evacuation; the 
broken promises of the federal government which included 
promises of no general evacuation, better housing, higher 
wages, and protection of property. (24:302) 
In January of 1943, the government decided that all 
Japanese must declare themselves loyal or disloyal. All 
persons 17 or over were asked, 1Will you swear unqualified 
allegiance to the United States of America . and for-
swear any form of allegiance or obedience to the Japanese 
Emperor •.• ?u (6:572) Almost 31,000 Japanese-Americans 
said yes, while more than 6,000 said no, and another 3,000 
refused to answer the question altogether. Why did these 
6,000 Japanese-Americans refuse to swear allegiance to the 
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United States? Four possible reasons are suggested: 
(1) as a protest against their wartime treatment; (2) family 
loyalty; (3) as security--they felt safe there until the war 
was over; (4) as a consequence of administrative confusion. 
( 6: 580) At I•iinidoka the negative responses were very few 
because of better conditions such as better constructed 
barracks, a friendly adjacent community, good rapport be-
tween evacuees and administrators, and the fact that the 
registration of the oath had been explained five days before. 
When the f'ederal government lifted the restrictions 
on Japanese enlisting in the armed forces, about 11,000 
Nisei volunteered. In Hawaii where there was no evacuation, 
one out of every three Nisei, or 9,507, ages 18 to 38 volun-
teered, but on the mainland only one out of fourteen or 1,208 
who were eligible volunteered. A possible reason for the 
relatively low number of mainland Nisei volunteers may have 
been that they had to volunteer from behind barbed ·wires and 
armed guard. (6:580} In the I<inidoka Center, because of 
good administrative explanation and cooperation with the 
Issei advisers, about 300 men volunteered. This represented 
25 per cent of the total who volunteered from the entire 
West Coast, while Kinidoka housed only seven per cent of the 
total West Coast Nisei. (24:308) These volunteers served 
in the 442nd Regimental Combat Team which was called the most 
decorated in the war. General Joseph Stillwell said, 1 ~The 
Nisei have bought an awful big chunk of America with their 
blood.tr (16:328) 
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CHAPTER III 
CONSEQUENCES OF THE EVACUATION 
By the evacuation of the Japanese the United States 
risked a blow to its world prestige, but because of the scope 
of World War II few persons noticed or protested the mass 
evacuation and relocation program that was being carried out. 
In Europe Nazi Germany was fighting for the doctrine of 
racial superiority; while Japan was fighting for the so-
called cause of the colored races struggling against their 
white oppressors. The United States might have built even 
greater strength and prestige at home and abroad out of the 
diversity of her minority groups, but the opportunity was 
completely thwarted. The mass evacuation policy seemed to 
affirm the enemy principles. (5:373) President Roosevelt had 
said, "The principle on which this country was founded and by 
which it has always been governed is that Americanism is a 
matter of mind and heart; Americanism is not, and never was, 
a matter of race or ancestry." (10:6) Yet, it was he who 
signed the order to incarcerate all West Coast Japanese. On 
the other hand, Roosevelt was the object of great pressure 
by citizens, Congressmen, and the military as a result of 
great national fear of the Japanese warlords who attacked 
the United States without warning. Military leaders, whose 
responsibility it was to defend the continental United States, 
demanded full powers to adequately protect the country from 
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possible internal and external attacks. Apparently there was 
little else for the President to do but sign the order 
giving the military leaders the power they needed to protect 
the country. However, the 15,400 German aliens and S,600 
Italian aliens in the Puget Sound region were never moved in 
a mass evacuation movement, yet the United States was also at 
war with Germany and Italy. The evacuation was called a 
military necessity by the military officials, yet not one 
resident, Issei or Nisei, had been found guilty of sabo-
tage either in Hawaii or on the mainland. Because of ties of 
race, tradition, culture and customs, the Japanese presented 
a strong, tightly-knit racial group to the military authori-
ties. The racial features of the Japanese marks them off 
from the Caucasian majority in the United States. Even 
though they were born and reared in the United States and 
became .Americans on the inside, they were still Orientals on 
the outside and thus identified with the enemies of the 
United States. (15:146) Thus not only the 41,000 Japanese 
aliens were evacuated from the entire West Coast, but also 
the 71,000 Nisei who were citizens. (9:69) The overzealous-
ness of the military to move all Japanese went so far as to 
affect all Japanese aliens, Nisei, all persons who were even 
a quarter Japanese, Caucasians married to Japanese, and 
Eskimos from Alaska who had a Japanese grandparent. (24:276) 
Not only did the Japanese suffer greatly, but the nation lost 
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the productivity that reduced its war potential. (1:132) It 
was estimated that in 1942 the Japanese worked about 56 per 
cent of all agricultural land in King County and about 39 per 
cent in Pierce County. (29:1) In addition, for almost the 
entire year of 1942 at least 50,000 Japanese on the West 
Coast who had been employed were now idle and many man hours 
of labor were lost. Finally, the cost to the federal govern-
ment of the mass evacuation program for only the first nine 
months was a staggering figure listed by the Army as 
$88,676,716.69. This amount included the construction of 
the assembly and relocation centers and the operation of the 
federal agencies such as the Farm 'Security Administration, the 
Federal Security Agency, and the Federal Works Agency, which 
were used to help the evacuees. (43:401) 
Even after the evacuees had been relocated, some 
Americans accused the War Relocation Authority of "pampering 
and coddling" the evacuees, but the WRA would point out some 
of the following things. 
1. 
2. 
4. 
The maximum for food cost per day for evacuees 
was 45 cents per person. 
The evacuees lived in only one room barracks 
with families of six or more having two rooms. 
The rooms were furnished with steel cots and 
bedding and nothing else. 
Evacuees received low wages--$12-$19 per month--
for work performed at the centers. (10:5) 
In addition, during the four years of internment, some 
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Americans had real apprehensions and misgivings about the 
evacuees after their evacuation. As one motion picture 
executive told a WRA staff member, "There must be something 
seriously wrong with those people or the Army wouldn't have 
"em all under wraps. That's all I need to know." (42:14) On 
the other hand some Americans did take the time to question 
and voice their complaints on the indiscriminate evacuation 
of the Japanese. Professor J. F. Steiner, chairman of the 
sociology department at the University of Washington, agreed 
that enemy aliens who lived near defense plants and military 
establishments should be moved. 
But when this plan of evacuation is enlarged to in-
clude citizens as well as aliens on the ground that 
American-born Japanese are inherently disloyal to 
this country, we are starting in motion a dangerous 
mass movement growing out of war hysteria and dif-
fering little from the treatment of minorities by 
the totalitarian governments in Europe and Asia. 
(5:192) 
For the evacuees, their removal and return brought 
about various consequences: the damage suffered to their 
status in the community, to their security and self-esteem, 
to their ability to earn, to their economic resources, (1:124) 
and to their family organization. Officials estimate that 
the Japanese evacuees were forced to leave behind some 200 
million dollars worth of real, personal, and commercial 
property. The average yearly loss for farmers and nursery 
men was $13,960 per family, business families suffered an 
average loss of $12,SlO, while families who worked for wages 
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lost an average of $7,350. (26:117) While evacuees were 
incarcerated, they received a wage for their work which 
ranged from $12 to $19 per month which did not compare with 
the wages military personnel received, which were notoriously 
low at that time. In addition the military personnel had 
pensions, benefits, and opportunities unavailable to the 
evacuees. In fact the compensations paid could only be 
compared to that paid in prisons. The family organization 
of the Japanese had also suffered by life in the relocation 
camps. No longer did families cook and eat as a typical 
family group, but now ate in cafeterias on diets that con-
sisted mainly of western food. In addition the Japanese 
experienced great damage to their status in the community 
when local papers appeared with the following page one head-
lines: nMore Japs Must Leave,n flStart Jap Camp in Valley," 
and "Japs Must Evacuate County.fl These headlines concerning 
resident Issei and Nisei appeared on the same front pages 
that told of the Japs capturing Singapore or the Japs sinking 
an American ship--the word "Japs" in these stories described 
the war making machine of Japan. (28:-) 
At the relocation centers the evacuees heard rumors 
based on stories that appeared in newspapers that many of 
their former communities didn't want them back. News stories 
and headlines in local Washington papers such as "Race 
Mongers Oppose Nisei,n only supported these rumors. Dillon 
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S. Myer, national director of WRA, said at a Seattle luncheon 
that "professional race Mongers and special economic groups 
were stirring up hatred in the interests of their own pocket-
books to keep Japanese-Americans from returning to the West 
Coast.n (21:3) At the same luncheon C. W. Doyle, executive 
director of the Central Labor Council, took exception to 
Myer's statement and said he felt that the armed forces 
should be returned before the "Japstt are allowed to come back. 
He said: 
I have my Grandfather's discharge papers from the 
Civil War. I guess I'm an American. But I am 
unalterably opposed to the return of the Japs at 
this particular time and the majority of the 200,000 
people in our council feel the same way. I've 
talked to soldiers, sailors, and they want to know 
how we can let the Japs come back here at this 
time. We better make some provision for our boys' 
return from the armed forces instead of debating 
the issue. (21: 3) 
Myer quickly answered this by telling Doyle: 
I repeat, the decision to allow the return of 
people of Japanese ancestry was the military's, 
not ours ••• I hope you told them (soldiers and 
sailors) that you were talking about Americans, 
not Japs as you call them. I hope you told them, 
if they have not been overseas, that there are 
17,600 boys of Japanese ancestry fighting in the 
armed forces. I'm not worried about the boys at 
Iwo Jima and in Italy. They've seen boys of 
Japanese ancestry spill their blood and they think 
they are fighting for the American way. (21:3) 
Senator Warren G. Magnuson of Washington State in April 1945 
felt that all evacuees should be given loyalty tests before 
being released from the centers. He said: "It is time every 
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Japanese-American stand up and be counted. This country has 
no place either in war or peace for anyone of questioned or 
questionable loyalty." (22:13) He also said certain Japanese 
aliens and Nisei should be subject to quick deportation if 
they didn't swear allegiance to the United States: 
Japanese aliens not deported promptly should be 
held subject to deportation on the first evidence 
of sympathy toward Japan, or unfriendliness to this 
country, deportation to be consummated without in-
volved and prolonged bureau procedures. 
Persons of Japanese ancestry born in America 
should also be subject to deportation unless they 
attest to their loyalty to the United States •••• 
Events have proved many Japanese although born 
in the United States have considered their real 
allegiance is to Japan. (22:13) 
This declaration of Senator Magnuson's raises an 
interesting point. Is it legal to deport an American-born 
citizen of the United States to the ancestrial homeland of 
his father? In the past history of our country aliens and 
naturalized citizens of the United States have been deported 
after due process of law to their former homeland, but the 
only course for native born citizens after due process of 
law would be confinement in•prison for a period of years. 
When the return of the evacuees appeared imminent in 
April 1945, 700 persons met at Overlake Grade School in 
Bellevue to plan a welcome for the loyal Nisei. Of course, 
the anti-Japanese groups were there with George Westbea of 
Auburn and C. Nifty Garrett of Sumner representing the 
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nRemember Pearl Harbor League, 11 but the majority of the 
people at the meeting were for the return of the loyal 
evacuees. The three leaders of this meeting were Linden 
Mander, University of Washington political science professor 
and member of Mayor Devin's Civic Unity Committee; John L. 
Fournier, Kent newspaper publisher; and the Rev. Frank Blish 
of Kirkland. Professor Mander told the group that "strong 
evidence that agitation against minority groups in some 
Seattle defense plants has been inspired by professional 
saboteurs.n (20:1} However, after the war when all evacuees 
were released, only about one half of the Japanese moved back 
to their homes on the west coast, the rest remained near the 
relocation camps or moved to new areas of the country. In 
March 1946, 52,000 had settled elsewhere and about 57,000 
evacuees were back on the Pacific Coast. In Washington 
State, according to the 1950 census, there were only 9,694 
Japanese as compared with the 14,560 in 1940. Most of the 
Japanese (7,573} continued to live on the west side of the 
Cascades and only 1,764 in eastern Washington with Spokane 
county having 1,171 of the latter total. 
The readjustment of these Japanese to their former 
communities after the war was helped by the lack of segrega-
tion in the public schools. However, much of their social 
activity was carried on entirely within Nisei and Issei 
groups. The prejudice that was evident in the early part of 
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the war again was present in 1945. The Native Sons of the 
Golden West, an anti-Oriental group in California, the 
Remember Pearl Harbor League, the Los Angeles Examiner, and 
the San Francisco Examiner all spoke against the return of 
the Japanese to the coastal areas. The Remember Pearl Harbor 
League distributed signs to businesses in Washington State--
signs that read, "No Japs," and "We Want No Japs Back Here, 
Ever." In some Pacific Coast cities the burial of Nisei 
soldiers was refused in their city cemetaries. In other 
areas, including Seattle and Tacoma, restrictive housing 
agreements to prohibit persons of Japanese ancestry from 
moving into specified districts were still in effect, even 
though the Supreme Court ruled that the law couldn't be used 
to enforce such agreements. It should be noted that not 
all evacuees experienced prejudice after the war. Yanosuke 
Takao, a gas truck driver before the evacuation, left the 
Tule Lake Center in 1945 for Idaho and worked in an orchard. 
There he felt no intolerance; however, he didn't tell his 
employer that he came from the Tule Lake Center because he 
was afraid of the reputation that the center had for being 
where a majority of the so-called disloyal evacuees were 
kept. (JS:-) Another evacuee, Shuichi Fukui, returned to 
Tacoma and started buying and then selling rice to returned 
evacuees and later opened a grocery store. Because he dealt 
mostly with Orientals he felt little or no discrimination upon 
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his return. Fukui not only went through the evacuation as a 
citizen of the United States and a veteran of World War I, 
but also lost one of his sons in action with the U. s. Army 
at Okinawa and another son while in the U. S. Army during 
the war. (4:-) The only case of discrimination that Jack 
and Sarah Sugimoto noted after their return to Tacoma was in 
1946 when Mrs. Sugimoto sought the services of a doctor. 
Seventeen days after the birth of a child, Mrs. Sugimoto 
developed an ulcerated tooth and made an appointment by phone 
with a receptionist for a local doctor. Upon arriving at the 
doctor's office, she was told that the "doctor didn't feel 
like working on a Japanese because he had fought in the South 
Pacific.n (27:-) Had the doctor questioned Mrs. Sugimoto 
he would have found out that she was a native born citizen of 
the United States. 
Several cases involving Japanese were taken to court. 
Such a case involved the Miyoshi family of Vashon Island, 
Washington. They owned a well-insured home and stored all 
their personal belongings in it until after the war. When 
they were evacuated, the insurance company cancelled their 
policy and no other company would insure them even though two 
of the brothers had served in the army. On February 1, 1945, 
when the family was allowed to return, the home was burned 
to the ground with the loss of all their personal belongings. 
The arsonists were caught, tried, sentenced, and were 
J ''.?, q ~) ~~ ') 
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compelled to make partial restitution. (24:2$7) In 1943 
the Supreme Court heard a case involving Gordon Hirabayashi, 
a senior at the University of Washington. Hirabayashi was 
convicted in district court for failing to report for evacua-
tion and for violating the curfew, and was sentenced to three 
months in jail on each count with all sentences running con-
currently. Hirabayashi said that if he registered he would 
be "giving helpless consent to the denial of all things which 
give me the incentive to live. I must maintain my Christian 
principles and I consider it my duty to maintain the demo-
cratic ideals for which this nation stands. 11 (37:1) The 
American Civil Liberties Union supported Hirabayashi's stand 
because "grave questions of constitutional rights are 
involved in the application of this order to .American citi-
zens without any inquiry into their loyalty." (37:1) The 
Supreme Court upheld the violation of the curfew and its 
legality, but ''Chief Justice Stone emphasized that nothing 
was decided regarding the constitutionality of the evacua-
tion." (11:3) In another appeal case involving Fred 
Toyosaburo Korematsu, who had refused to obey the exclusion 
orders and had been found guilty in District Court, the 
United States Supreme Court upheld the wartime exclusion 
orders in a six to three decision with Justices Roberts, 
Murphy, and Jackson dissenting. The majority represented 
by Justice Black said: 
Compulsory exclusion of large groups of citizens 
from their homes except under circumstances of 
direct emergency and peril, is inconsistent with 
our basic governmental institutions. But when 
under conditions of modern warfare our shores 
arre [SiiJ threatened by hostile forces, the 
power to protect must be commensurate with the 
threatened danger • • • • 
••• We cannot by availing ourselves of the 
calm perspective of hindsight--now say that at 
that time these actions were unjustified. (14:2) 
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On the other hand, Justice Jackson's dissenting opion is 
frequently quoted by constitutional lawyers. He said in part: 
But here is an attempt to make an otherwise inno-
cent act a crime merely because this prisoner is 
the son of parents as to whom he had no choice and 
belongs to a race from which there is no way to 
resign. If Congress in peacetime should enact 
such a criminal law, I should suppose this Court 
would refuse to enforce it •••• 
• • • Much is said of the danger to liberty from 
the Army program for deporting and detaining these 
citizens of Japanese extraction. But a judicial 
construction of due process clause that will sus-
tain this order is a far more subtle blow to 
liberty than the promulgation of the order itself. 
A military order, however unconstitutional, is not 
apt to last longer than the military emergency. 
Even during that period a succeeding commander may 
revoke it all. 
But once a judicial opinion rationalizes such 
an order to show that it conforms to the Constitu-
tion or rather rationalizes the Constitution to 
show that the Constitution sanctions such an order, 
the Court for all time has validated the principle 
of racial discrimination in criminal procedure and 
of transplanting American citizens. 
I should hold that a civil court cannot be made to 
enforce an order which violates constitutional limi-
tations even if it is a reasonable exercise of mili-
tary authority. The courts can exercise only the 
judicial power, can apply only the law, and 
must abide by the Constitution, or they cease to be 
courts and become instruments of military power •• (14:4) 
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Justice Murphy also noted that the curfew order nbears a 
melancholy resemblance to the treatment accorded to members 
of the Jewish race in Germany and in other parts of Europe." 
(3:252) 
While the Hirabayashi and Korematsu cases involved 
only individual appeals to the Supreme Court, it may be asked 
why didn't the Nisei, through such an organization as the 
Japanese-American Citizens League bring legal action against 
the mass evacuation and relocation program? First of all the 
leadership of such organizations as the JACL and similar 
groups had been detained at the out-break of the war by the 
FBI, thus providing a period of time for these groups with no 
leadership available. Secondly, the Nisei felt that to bring 
such a case to court would reflect on their loyalty at a 
crucial time for the country and for their future as was 
pointed out in a book published by the evacuees at Minidoka: 
We did not wish to test the legality of restraints 
on our freedom. We believed that the obedient, quiet 
cooperation with the government's plan would indi-
cate the genuineness of our loyalty and should be 
accepted as our contribution and sacrifice to the 
war effort. Of more importance is the realization 
of the government and its people that the evacuation 
was a mistake from a standpoint of humanity if not 
from a standpoint of constitutionality. (10:5) 
However, the Nisei, who were by birth citizens of the United 
States were denied due process of law in that no formal 
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charges were ever brought against them, no trial was held, no 
jury sat in judgment, and no witnesses were called to prove 
any charges against them. The Japanese-Americans were the 
immediate victims of the evacuation, but "larger consequences 
are carried by the American people as a whole. Their legacy 
is the lasting one of precedent and constitutional sanctity 
for a policy of mass incarceration under military auspices. 
This is the most important result of the process by which the 
evacuation decision was made. That process betrayed all 
Americans." (5:374} Eugene V. Rostow, professor of law at 
Yale, judged the evacuation on legal grounds and said it was 
"our worst wartime mistake. Its motivation and its impact 
on our system of law deny every value of democracy." (24:290} 
"The immediate goal of the evacuation was presumably 
clear cut: Protection of the West Coast as a war measure. 
But the national government, in addition to winning the war 
abroad, had an equal responsibility for maintaining democracy 
at home." (5:372} The evacuation violated the fundamental 
liberties of Americans and has continued a dangerous 
precedent from the American Civil War that military necessity 
may override the civil rights of all Americans. 
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